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The recent financial crisis has witnessed significant systemic risks which arise 
from the financial intermediaries’ risky portfolios. There is substantial evidence 
that most of financial intermediaries have achieved amazingly high profit in the 
golden age of mortgage securitization market because they either want to or have 
to accept much higher risk than before.  In this paper, I develop a very stylized 
theoretical model in which commercial banks originate, securitize, distribute, and 
trade loans, or hold cash. They can also borrow money by using their security 
holdings as collateral. The model predicts that banks got themselves into so much 
trouble in mortgage market not because of their irrationality or misestimate but by 
taking advantage of extraordinary temporary profit opportunities offered by 
securitization. Profit maximizing behavior in securitization by banks in the 
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During the past three years, financial markets have suffered ruinous losses. These 
were originally triggered by massive defaults in subprime mortgage markets. It is 
widely accepted that the failure of subprime mortgage market led to the broad 
global financial crisis and the collapse of Bear Sterns, Lehman Brothers, and 
many others. But, in fact, the outstanding amount of subprime securities was not 
large enough to cause a systemic crisis by itself. In 2007, subprime stood at about 
$1.2 trillion outstanding, of which about 80 percent was rated AAA and to date 
has had a limit amounts of losses. For comparison, the total size of the traditional 
and parallel banking systems is about $20 trillion1. 
Further, the timing is wrong. Subprime mortgages and securities started to 
deteriorate in January 2007, eight months before the panic in August. Longstaff 
(2010) showed that the ABX index2 return is able to Granger-cause returns in 
other markets such as Treasury bonds, corporate bonds, S&P 500 stock indexes, 
and the VIX during the beginning of the subprime crisis, but not before or after. 
Subprime securities played a significant role in the crisis. But do not explain the 
crisis. The 2007 financial crisis was a system bank run. It did not occur in the 
                                                            
1 Gorton(2010) 
2 ABX indexes consist of daily closing values obtained from market dealers for subprime home-
equity-related CDOs of various credit ratings. ABX indexes are widely used as the proxy of 
subprime fundamentals. 
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traditional banking system, but instead took place in the modern “shadow” 
banking system. 
 
Modern shadow banking system 
 
Traditional banks were the lenders that held loans until they matured or were paid 
off. These loans were funded by direct obligations of the bank, primarily by 
deposits and sometimes by debt. Such a model can no longer describe modern 
banks or other financial intermediaries that progressively combine assets into 
pools, which are split into shares through securitization. Securitization, converting 
illiquid assets into liquid securities, has grown significantly in recent years, with 
the universe of securitized mortgage loans reaching $3.6 trillion3 in 2006. The 
option to sell loans to investors has already transformed the traditional role of 
financial intermediaries in the mortgage market from “buying and holding” to 





3 Commercial mortgages included 
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Figure 14 Modern banking system 
 
The above figure shows the processes the traditional banking system used to fund 
its activities just prior to the 2007 financial crisis. The loans made to consumers 
and corporations, on the left side of the figure, correspond to the credit creation 
the traditional banking system was involved in. Where do the traditional banksers 
obtain the money to lend to corporations and consumers? Portfolios of loans were 
sold as bonds, to various securitization vehicles in the parallel banking system 
                                                            
4 Source: Gordian Knot 
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(the grey box in Figure.1). These vehicles are conduits, structured investment 
vehicles (SIVs), limited purpose finance corporations (LPFCs), collateralized loan 
obligations (CLOs), collateralized bond obligations (CBOs), collateralized debt 
obligations (CDOs), and specialist credit managers. Like traditional banks, these 
vehicles are intermediaries. They, in turn, are financed by the investors on the 
right side of the figure. 
The perceived benefits of this financial innovation, such as improving risk sharing 
and reducing banks’ cost of capital, are widely cited. On the other hand, critics 
argue that the pass-through of loans to securitization markets damped originator’s 
incentives to appropriately screen loans. Those concerns have been cited among 
flaws of the “originate to distribute” model by Bernanke (2008), Mishkin (2008) 
and Keys, et al (2008). The most outstanding characteristic of the new banking 
system or the parallel banking system is securitization. Among the entire US 
fixed-income capital markets, mortgage-related securities or mortgages-backed 
securities market is the largest, accounting for more than 40 percent of the total 
market (Fig.2.). 
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Figure 25 Debt issuance in U.S. markets  
 
In the mortgage-backed securities market, the loans can be either kept in lenders’ 
portfolios or sold into the secondary mortgage market and further pooled and 
passed through to MBS (mortgage-backed securities) issuers shortly after 
origination. In the residential mortgage-backed securities market, lenders typically 
sell mortgage loans to either Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, which are government-
sponsored enterprises (GSEs)6, or to a private sector financial institution, such as 
subsidiaries of investment banks, large commercial banks, and homebuilders. In 
                                                            
5 Sources: U.S. Department of Treasury, Federal Agencies, Thomson Financial, Inside MBS & 
ABS, Bloomberg. 
6 These entities have been under the “conservatorship” of U.S. government since 2008 
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the commercial mortgage-backed securities market, the loans sold to secondary 
market are typically called “conduit” loans. Unlike portfolio loans which are 
originated and held on lender portfolios balance sheets, conduit loans are 
originated for the sole purpose of sale into the securities market. 
Another key element of the shadow banking system is the use of off-balance sheet 
financing, which differs substantially from the on-balance sheet financing of 
traditional banks. Moreover, the increasing uses of repos to meet the needs for 
short-term off balance sheet financing is an important development. A Repo is a 
financial contract used by market participants to meet short term liquidity needs. 
In a typical repo transaction there are two parties; the “bank” or “borrower” and 
another party, the “depositor” or “lender”. The depositor places money with the 
bank and the bank provide bonds as collateral to back the deposit. The depositor 
earns interest, the repo rate. Repo is often overnight, so the money can be 
withdrawn easily by not renewing or “rolling the repo.” There is no government 
guarantee for the repo contract, but there is collateral, valued at market prices. 
Another important feature of repo contracts is the “haircut”. A large investor, for 
example, may deposit $10 million and receive bonds worth $10 million. This is a 
case of a zero “haircut”. If the depositor deposits only $9 million and takes $10 
million of bonds as collateral, there is a 10 percent haircut. In that case, the bank 
has to finance the other $1 million in other way, for example, issuing new 
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liabilities. Another important feature of the repo market is that the collateral was 
very often securitized bonds (asset-backed securities-ABS7, RMBS, and CMBS). 
In the pre-crisis period, haircuts were zero for all the asset classes. But when the 
system began is deteriorating, repo haircuts grow rapidly. To understand the 
impact of the bank run on the repo market, the estimated size of the repo market is 
$10 trillion, which is the same size as regulated banking sector.8 If the average 
haircut goes from zero to, say, 20 percent, as it did during the crisis, the 
securitized banking system needs to find $2 trillion from other sources to fund its 
activities. The primary measure available for these banks to make up the 
difference was asset fire sales, which caused further downward pressure on prices, 
making the assets less valuable as collateral9. 
This paper was originally motivated by Shleifer and Vishny’s (2009) paper 
“Unstable Banking”. In their paper, Shleifer and Vishny derive a stylized model 
of financial intermediaries’ behavior in financing, securitizing, distributing and 
trading projects. The theory predicts that bank credit and real investment will be 
volatile when market prices of project loans are volatile, but it also shows the 
instability of banks, especially leveraged banks. Profit-maximizing behavior 
creates systemic risk. By bringing Shleifer and Vishny’s model to the mortgage 
market context, we derived more intuitive explanations on the banks’ massive loss 
                                                            
7 The securitization of non-mortgage loans is called asset-backed securities (ABS). 
8 This is the number that most repo traders give as an estimate. Gorton (2010) 
9 Brunnermeier (2009) 
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by profit maximizing behavior in the mortgage market during the financial crisis. 
Meanwhile our theoretical model will contribute to the broad strands of empirical 
research on banks’ choice of loans to securitize and whether the loans they sell 
into the secondary mortgage market are riskier than the loans they retain in their 
portfolios.  
We proceed as follows: in the next section, we will review banks’ choice of 
mortgage loans into securitization or portfolio from the empirical literature and 
then conjecture the banks’ three stage profit maximizing behaviors before the 
financial crisis and how these profit maximizing behaviors hurt banks during the 
financial crisis. In the section III, we would develop a stylized theoretical model 




It is commonly believed that information asymmetry is an important feature of the 
mortgage market. Informed portfolio lenders possess private information on loan 
quality and try to liquefy lower quality loans. In contrast, conduit lenders who 
originate loans for direct sale into securitization markets possess no usable private 
information. But, in fact, large evidence documented in prior research suggests 
that the portfolio loans held on bank’s balance sheets were, ex post of lower 
9 | P a g e  
 
quality than conduit loans.This hurt the origination bank more than it did the 
secondary market during the 2007 financial crisis. Jiang, Nelson, Vytlacil (2010) 
state that, although many blame banks for unloading low quality loans to 
investors through securitization, the same banks also suffered the heaviest losses 
among all financial institutions during the crisis. 
By contrasting the ex ante and ex post relations between mortgage securitization 
and loan performance using a comprehensive RMBS (residential mortgage-
backed securities) dataset, Jiang, Nelson, Vytlacil (2010) concluded that once 
loans were originated, investors’ information advantage over the bank increased 
over time. And, indeed, they use such information strategically against banks. 
Meanwhile, evidence from the CMBS (commercial mortgage-backed securities) 
market also supports the above finding. An, Deng, Gabriel (2010) conclude that 
CMBS conduit loans mitigated the “lemons problem” and were therefore priced 
higher than portfolio loans despite the wide spread belief the conduit loans were 
of lower quality on average. The most recent research on lenders’ choice was 
conducted by Sumit, Yan, Yavas (2011). Using a large dataset of mortgage loans 
originated between 2004 and 2008, they find that banks sold low default risk 
loans into the secondary market while keeping higher default risk loans in their 
portfolios. This result holds for both subprime and prime loans. In addition, 
securitized loans had higher prepayment risk than portfolio loans. It therefore 
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appears that in return for selling loans with lower default risk, lenders retain loans 
with lower prepayment risk. 
Why would such sophisticated financial intermediaries hold low quality loans on 
their own balance sheet rather than passing them on to others? Why din’t they sell 
the low quality loans at a discount price? In fact, it is commonly believed that 
banks did not aggressively cut price in order to facilitate sales-largely because 
cutting prices would adversely impact the bank’s balance sheet. 10  We now 
conjecture the behavior of banks before the financial crisis. First, banks used their 
scare capital to originate and securitize loans to meet investor appetite for AAA 
rated loans from foreigners, pension funds and insurance companies. Because the 
moral hazard problem on the bank’s part ended up due to the presence of the 
secondary market, the investors could use such information strategically against 
the banks. The consequence of the process was that investors purchased high 
quality loans and left bad loans to banks. In the meantime, banks earned large fees 
for selling loans and were reluctant to sell low quality portfolio loans at discount 
price. In normal times, these loans were safe and high yielding and banks 
expected to make extraordinary temporary profit. We can see that banks make 
large profits in almost every stage of a security life and in any quality of the loans 
which is a typical profit maximizing behavior. However, in bad times, this 
                                                            
10 Quoted from Jiang, Nelson, Vytlacil [2010] “However, our conversation with the bank officials 
indicated that during our sample period the bank did not aggressively cut price in order to facilitate 
sale-mostly because cutting price would adversely impact the bank’s balance sheet 
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behavior is more dangerous to bank than to other market participant. We would 
rather say that banks know the market condition better than the loans they 
originated. Shleifer and Vishny (2009) argue that banks use up all their capital in 
booms knowing full well that a crisis will come and they may suffer losses. But 
they believe there is so much money to be made during booms that they should 
nonetheless extend themselves fully. 
Another significant reason for holding high price, low quality loans is that banks 
want to use securities it holds as collateral, especially collateral in Repo 
(Repurchase agreement) market. The increasing reliance on short-term debt 
caused maturity mismatch. Repo used by banks had maturities of less than three 
months and the fraction of total investment bank assets financed by overnight 
repos roughly doubled from 2000 to 2007.11 A large part of banks’ liabilities had 
to be rolled over on a daily basis for this reason which made banks more fragile 





11 Brunnermeier (2009) 
12 | P a g e  
 
Figure 3 Average Repo haircut on structured debt12 
 
Figure 4 Repo haircuts on different categories of structured products13 
 
                                                            
12 Source: Gorton and Metrick (2009a) 
 
13 Source: Gorton and Metrick (2009a) 
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Figure 4 confirms that haircuts were higher on subprime-related assets. In fact, the 
haircut eventually went to 100 percent, that is, these assets were not acceptable as 
collateral. The non-subprime-related assets reached a maximum of a 20 percent 
haircut. 
It was the high haircuts that lead to Lehman Brothers collapse during the financial 
crisis. In fact, most of the banks hold portfolio on their loans to expand their 
balance sheet by collateral and using these risky capitals to originate and 
securitize more loans to meet the investors’ strong sentiment. It thus appears that 
securitization and collateral leverage increased bank profits, but simultaneously 
raised bank’s risk. Indeed, bank maximized its profit by rising risk in the 




We consider a model with three periods: 1, 2, and 3. The model is highly stylized 
in that we do not derive optimal financial contract, rather was assume a reduced 
form version of these contracts. For simplicity, we examine the model with no 
fundamental risk to investment and a risk-free interest rate of zero. 
Modeling projects 
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Real activity in the model consists of loans that become available in periods 1 and 
2 and that pay off in period 3. Each loan costs $1 to undertake. We consider 
identical loans in the beginning and heterogeneous loans later. When started at 
t=1, these loans pay a known amount Z in t=3. When started at t=2, these projects 
pay the same known amount Z in the same t=3 for certain. Period 1 loans are long 
term and do not pay off until time 3. The supply of loans costing $1 and yielding 
Z>1 is infinite, so their realization is constrained only by finance. 
All loans must be financed by banks. When a bank finances a $1 loan, it collects 
an up-front fee f from the mortgagee and a certain repayment of $1 at t=3. For 
simplicity, we assume that the mortgagee pays the fee from his personal funds. 
Modeling banks 
The representative bank comes into period 1 with E0 in equity. Let Nt be the 
number of new loans the bank finances at time t=1, 2, and 3, where E0 is equity at 
the very start. 
The bank can use its endowment in three ways. First, it can hold cash. We denote 
by C the amount of cash it holds at the end of period 1. Under our assumptions, 
the bank never chooses to hold cash at time 2 because there are no opportunities 
arising at time 3. The bank can also purchase securities. Finally, banks can lend 
money for loans, in which case it collects the fee up front and receives the 
repayment of $1 for certain at time 3. 
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The bank can do one of two things with these loans. It can keep them on its books, 
which we refer to as traditional lending. Alternatively, the bank can securitize 
these loans and sell them in the financial market. We do not model packaging and 
tranching of loans, so securitization looks like loan syndication. Packaging and 
tranching would only amplify the effects. In fact, an important benefit of real 
securitization with packaging and tranching is that AAA securities can be used as 
collateral with a very low haircut. 
Our assumption about securitization is that when the bank sells a loan in the 
market it must initially keep a fraction d (the bank’s necessary initial “skin in the 
game”) when it securitizes loans. Empirically, the most common arrangement in 
loan sales is for the bank to retain a portion of the loan.14 
When the bank securitizes a loan, it can sell the securities it does not retain in the 
market. We denote by Pt with t=1, 2 the price of the securities at time t. We take 
security prices as exogenous. 
The bank can borrow in financial markets using the securities it holds as collateral. 
We denote by Lt the stock of short-term borrowing by the bank from the market at 
time t=1, 2. For security, lenders to the bank insist the bank must at all times 
maintain a constant haircut h in the form of securities on its debt; that is, Lt = (1-h) 
× collateral. If the price of securities falls at time 2, the bank might have to 
                                                            
14 Gorton and Pennacchi (1995) 
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liquidate some of its portfolios of securities to maintain the haircut. We define S 
as the number of securities the bank sells at time 2. 
Variables summary: 
Z: projects payoff at period 3 
f: up-front fee for project financing 
E0: bank’s equity endowment 
C: cash hold by banks 
d: bank’s “skin” in the securitization 
P: price of securities 
L: stock of borrowing by bank 
h: collateral “haircut” 
S: the number of securities bank sells at time 2 
Securitization without leverage 
In this section, we consider the case of no bank leverage: h = 1, L = 0. We first 
deal with the case of P1 = 1 which means there is no speculative gains to the bank 
from underwriting securities. 
Traditional lending: d = 1 
17 | P a g e  
 
We begin with traditional lending, in which the bank cannot sell project loans in 
the market. Assume all projects available at t=1 and 2 are identical. If the bank 
uses all of its balance sheet in period 1, it uses all of E0 to finance N = E0 loans 
and keeps all of them on its portfolios. The bank collects E0f as fees. Because the 
interest rate is equal to zero, it costs the bank nothing to save its capital until t=2. 
The assumption is that, there is no reason for banks to cyclically invest for 
traditional lending. 
Securitization: d < 1 
Now we assume the bank can securitize its loans. If it uses up all of its 
endowment at t=1, it can finance N = E0/d projects and keep dN = E0 as skin in 
the game on securities on its portfolios. Obviously, E0/d> E0, so the number of 
loans financed expand, as does the balance sheet. Meanwhile, profits at t=1 are 
now f E0/d> f E0. The bank has greatly increased its profit by securitization. At 
time 2, if P2<1, the bank suffer capital losses. But these losses lead to no need for 
liquidation. 
To demonstrate the main ideas, we assume that the bank knows that security 
prices will fall below 1 at t=2 (P2<1). We are interested in which circumstances 
the bank would use all its balance sheet to finance securitization even if they 
know the good times will not last and the market will shortly crash. We need three 
conditions if bank uses all its balance sheet to finance securities in period 1. 
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 First, the bank must not want to securitize at t=2 when P2<1. Second, the bank 
must not want to sell its securities at P2 and use the proceeds for lending to new 
projects. The condition for the bank not to sell at t=2 is given by 
ଵି୮మ
୮మ ൐ ݂                                                       (1) 
Which means that holding securities for capital gains at t=3 is more profitable 
than selling them and collecting fees from new firms. We can see that 
 ݂ ൏ 1 െ pଶ                                                  (2) 
We can see that (2) is sufficient for both of above two conditions to hold. Third, 
we need to assume that the bank does not wish to hoard any cash at t=1 to invest 
in undervalued securities at t=2. If the bank uses all its capital at t=1 for 
securitization. Its profits are N f = f E0/d. However, if the bank saves C for the 
period 2 and invests it in undervalued securities, then its profits are f (E0-C)/d + C 






ୢ ൅ c ቀ
ଵିPమ





Pమ                                                       (4) 
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From our model, the condition for not hoarding cash is to hold when d is small 
and P2 is not too far below 1. In the following calibration of equation (4), we 
choose f = 0.09, d = 0.2. These parameters are chosen to take into account the 
empirical evidence and economic considerations. As showed in Fig.5, we can see 
that until P2 lose more than one third of its original value, the bank begins to hold 
cash.  
Figure 5 Calibretion of equation (4) 
 
Therefore the bank prefers not to hold any cash as long as the price is not 
expected to crash. The bank does not care to wait for future lending or security 
trading and would use up all its balance sheet to securitize loans in period 1. The 
market is so good that the bank wants to expand its balance sheet to maximize 
loans. In Fig.6, we show the sharp decline in cash holdings by U.S. commercial 
C
P220/290
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banks before the 2007 financial crisis and the sharp increase in cash holding 
mostly asked by regulators after the crisis. 
Figure 6 cash as a proportion of total assets of us commercial banks15 
 
Combining (2) and (4), we obtain, 
1 െ pଶ ൐ ݂ ൐ ଵି୮మ୮మ d                                  (5) 
The condition implies  the bank will use up its balance sheet in securitization in 
period 1 to make extraordinary temporary profit when the mortgage origination 
                                                            
15 source:H8 database, Federal Reserve 
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fee f lies between 1 െ pଶ and ଵି୮మ୮మ d. The origination fee plays an important role 
in securitizing and profit maximizing behavior. If equation (5) holds, bank will 
use up all their capital in booms knowing full well that a crisis may come and they 
will suffer losses. But they realize that there is so much profit to be made during 
booms that they should nonetheless extend themselves fully. Bank profits and 
balance sheets are therefore highly cyclical. Bank solvency becomes volatile, 
which leads to the instability of the financial system. 
From equation (5), we can derive a preliminary optimal mortgage contract on 
origination fee f. For a banking system focusing on mortgage origination and 
securitization which pursue a smooth and steady financing and non-periodical 
profit, the optimal origination fee should be either less thanଵି୮మ୮మ d, or larger than 
1 െ pଶ , as long as f do not locate between the range. That is, f should be 
considerably low or extremely high to make the banking system stable. In the 
following calibration of equation (5), we choose the real-world origination fee 
݂ א ሾ0.08.0.13ሿ16 and P2 changing from 0.65 to 0.95 and see how the change of f 
react to it.  As shown in Fig.7, when P2 is decreasing from 0.85 to 0.75, there is 
much more possibility for real-world f (0.08-0.13) entering into the no-cash-
saving zone which is shown by two-headed arrows. The bank has stronger 
                                                            
16 A Consumer’s Guide to Mortgage Settlement Costs. 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/settlement/default.htm 
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incentives to use up all its capital in booming time even if knowing full well that 
the price will go down. 
Figure 7 calibration of equation (5)  
 
Fees from securitizing mortgages and other financial assets and from servicing 
these securitized pools have become much more important to large banks in the 
past two decades. The FDIC reports that in 2006 commercial banks had $20 
billion in net securitization income, which was 11.9% of all noninterest income. 
Big banks get almost all of it; less than 1% of banks reported any such income at 
all. The fact that many mortgage-backed securities are guaranteed by quasi-
governmental agencies accelerated the growth of the market. In 1996, there were 
$770 billion of asset backed securities of all kinds, 37% of which were mortgage-
backed. By 2005 the total had reached $3 trillion, 71% of which were mortgage-
backed. Banks thus have an incentive to maximize the flow of mortgages into 
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securitization because fee income is substantial and the loans are moved off 
balance sheet, so returns on income and on equity rise with the volume of 
securitized loans. 
Heterogeneous Loans 
With homogenous loans, there is no reason for the bank to smooth financial 
activity. Now assume the bank has access to high quality17 loans every period, but 
the number of these loans is limited to NH and the supply of low quality loans is 
infinite. There are high (H) and low (L) quality loans that all cost the same, but 
pay off ZH and ZL with ZL<ZH and fL<fH.18 
 When there is no securitization, d=1. If E0≤2NH, the bank will finance E0/2 high 
loans each period. In this situation bank’s financing is complete smoothing. If 
E0>2NH, the bank will finance all high loans and some low loans each period 
which is also complete smoothing. When there is securitization at period 1, d<1. 
And E0>2NH, P2<1-f, so the bank does not want to securitize at period 2. The 
profit of bank does not want to securitize at period 2 and securitizes everything it 
can at period 1 is given by, 
π୬୭ ୱୟ୴ୣ ൌ  NH · H݂ ൅ ሺEబௗ െ NHሻ L݂                     (6) 
                                                            
17 High quality loans here refer to prime mortgage loans and low quality loans refer to subprime 
mortgage loans 
18 The payoff of the mortgage loans is risk-adjustment payoff. After risk-adjustment, the payoff of 
high quality loans is higher than low quality loans. 
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The bank saves NH and finances new loans at period 2 is given by, 
πୱୟ୴ୣ ൌ ቀEబିNHୢ െ NHቁ L݂ ൅ 2NH H݂                   (7) 
The condition for the bank using up all of its balance sheet to lend to loans at 
period 1 and saves nothing for period 2 is given by, 
π୬୭ ୱୟ୴ୣ ൐ πୱୟ୴ୣ if  L݂d ൐ H݂ 
So, the condition would hold unless the high loans are hugely better than the low 
ones. We can see the bank’s financing is smooth. The benefits from originating 
more loans through securitization are so high that the bank would smooth its 
funding and originate some good loans in bad times. But the above is special to 
the case of P1=1. When P1>1, the situation would break, as we discuss below. 
Bubbles 
Next, we consider what happens when there is a bubble in period 1, P1>1. If the 
bank finances and securitizes all the loans it can, it must keep Nd as skin in the 
game, Nd=E0.  If the bank makes gain from high security prices in period 1, the 
distributed profits are given by, 
(Pଵ െ 1ሻሺ1 െ dሻN ൅ N݂ ൐ ݂ܰ               (8) 
We can see the incentive to save cash by waiting for the next period of good loans 
is now weaker than before. To illustrate the point, we suppose there are two kinds 
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of loans each period: high ones with ZH>1and a positive fee, low ones with ZL=1 
and a zero fee. Suppose all loans can be securitized at period 1 and sold off at 
P1>1, but the price falls period 2. So, as long as P1 is high enough, it pays the 
bank to use all of its balance sheet for securitization at period 1, including 
originating the low loans and to make no loans in period 2 for high loans. In this 
model, the bubble breaks the rule of smooth financing and creates a distortion in 
excessive financing of less attractive loans during booms. This distortion becomes 
even larger if different types of loans vary according to the profitability of 
securitizing them. 
Mortgage loans involve three kinds of risk: interest rate risk, prepayment risk and 
default risk. Interest rate risk is independent of the borrower’s and lender’s 
characteristics. Prepayment risk refers to the risk the mortgages may be repaid 
early. We focus on the competing risks of prepayment and default. From the 
above model, we can see if there is a bubble in period 1, P1>1.  Bank will use up 
all its balance sheet to securitization loans and trading these loans in the mortgage 
market. We are interested in investigating the bank’s choice of whether to sell into 
the secondary mortgage market or retain loans in its portfolios when there is a 
bubble.  
We denote the payoff of high quality loans with high prepayment risk by ZH, P, the 
payoff of high quality loans with high default risk by ZH, D, and the payoff of low 
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quality loans as ZL, P, ZL, D. To illustrate, suppose that the high prepayment risk 
mortgage loans would be prepaid in period 2 with ZH, P=1, and ZL, P=1. And high 
default risk mortgage loans would default in either period 2 or period 3. The 
payoff of the high default risk loans is complicated. For high quality mortgage 
loans, commonly treated as prime loans, the government sponsored enterprises 
(GSEs) offer investors guarantees against default risk, which means ZH, D≥1. For 
the low quality high default risk loans without GSEs guarantee, ZL, D should be 
less than 1. When there is a bubble, P1>1= ZH, P. So, bank should prefer to sell 
high prepayment risk prime mortgage loans in period 1to make an extra P1-1 in 
trading gains and not to wait for prepayment in period 2. And then bank would 
compare P1 with ZH, D. If ZH, D> P1, the bank would hold these prime high default 
risk mortgage loans in its portfolio and wait for profits in the next period. If ZH, D< 
P1, bank would sell some of the prime high default risk loans to secondary market. 
The reason the bank does not sell all of its prime high default risk loans is that P2 
and P3 are uncertain and now that period 1 is in the bubble, the expected price of 
P2, P3 should be higher. From the above model, we see that, in the booming times, 
the bank has no reason to hold high prepayment risk prime mortgage loans in its 
portfolio and would sell these loans to secondary market; meanwhile the bank 
would keep at least part of the high default risk prime mortgage loans on its books. 
During years of high refinancing and low default, retaining loans with lower 
prepayment risk is a much more profitable strategy than retaining loans with 
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lower default risk. In fact, the prepayment risk and default risk are competing risk 
in the mortgage market. So, high prepayment risk means low default risk as well, 
and high default risk means low prepayment risk. The bank, in fact, sells high 
prepayment low default risk loans to the investors and keeps high default risk low 
prepayment risk loans in their portfolio. It appears that in return for selling loans 
with lower default risk, lenders retain loans with lower prepayment risk. 
Furthermore, trading low default risk for low prepayment risk helps originators 
maintain their reputations, make huge temporary profit in the good time but 
would hurt the bank most due to holding high default risk loans in their portfolio 
in the bad time. 
For the subprime high default risk loans which have no GSEs guarantee against 
default risk, the payoff would be less than 1 in either period 2 or 3. When there is 
bubble, we have P1> ZL, P=1≥ ZL, D. From ZL, P=1≥ ZL, D, we can see bank prefer to 
hold high prepayment risk low default risk loans in their portfolio and sell low 
prepayment high default risk loans to investors. In fact, when considering that P1 
is higher than both ZL, P and ZL, D in period 1, the bank has strong incentive to sell 
all the loans to the secondary market to make temporary bubble profit in period 1. 
Keeping subprime high default or high prepayment risk loans in portfolio become 
less attractive for bank during booms. In fact, as the development of U.S. 
subprime mortgage market, a special type of subprime mortgage lenders which 
only focuses on originating and trading mortgage securities come to appear, like 
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New Century Financial Corporation, Country wide Financial. Our model shows 
that the appearance of these companies is accompanied with the rising bubble in 
the subprime mortgage market. When trading profit is higher than holding capital 
gain in the subprime mortgage market, company would expand their balance sheet 
to originate more loans and sell up all of loans into the secondary market to make 
huge profit. Moreover, our model shows that when the subprime mortgage 
securities market is in bubble, bank has no certain preference to hold subprime 
high default risk loans or high prepayment risk loans in the portfolio. Bank would 
rather to sell them up in period 1. 
There is a long running debate about whether securitized loans perform worse 
than portfolio loans in the literature. The results are mixed. Earlier work on the 
securitization of prime mortgages (Ambrose, LaCourt-Little and Sanders, 2005) 
found that securitized loans tend to perform better than similar portfolio loans. 
Elul (2009) found that securitized prime loans have higher default rates than 
portfolio loans, but securitized subprime loans do not perform worse than 
portfolio loans. Sumit, Yan and Yavas (2010) found banks sold low default risk 
loans into the secondary market and retained higher default risk loans on their 
portfolios; this the result holds for both subprime and prime loans. Moreover, 
their finding supported that securitized loans had a higher prepayment risk than 
portfolio loans. Our model supports the finding of Sumit, Yan and Yavas (2010) 
that banks sold low default risk loans to investors and held high default risk loans 
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on their portfolio, while from the result of subprime mortgage market, our model 
support the finding of Elul (2009) which banks sold high default risk loans to 
investors and hold low default risk loans on their portfolio although this choice 
would be mitigated by the high price P1 which attract bank to sell up all of the 
loans. Our model arises more challenging to the empirical study on this topic. 
Securitization with leverage 
Assume that bank can borrow from the market by using their securities as 
collateral. We suppose the debt is short term and price of securities do not move 
fast, so that cash lenders can liquidate the collateral fast to be repaid. The 
mechanism of making the lenders safe is the haircut h. The borrowers must meet 




EమାLమ ൌ h                      (9) 
If the P2 falls, securities must be liquidated to maintain the haircut. We begin with 
P1=1. If bank uses up all of its balance sheet, both equity and short-term debt, for 
securitize loans, the skin in the game is, 
E଴ ൅ Lଵ ൌ Nd                             (10) 
The condition of limited borrowing capacity at period 1 is, 
Eభ
EభାLభ ൌ h                                    (11) 
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Solving the equilibrium numbers of loans, we get, 
N ൌ Eభୢ୦                                         (12) 
From equation 12, we can see bank’s balance sheet expand. The bank can finance 
ଵ
ୢ୦ times its equity in loans. If h=0.2, d=0.2, then the bank can finances 25 times in 
loans. 
In period 2, when prices fall to P2<1-f, the bank would not originate and trade 
loans profitably. In fact, the bank needs to maintain the haircut by selling 
securities. Assume bank sells S securities. So, bank holds Nd-S securities valued 
at (Nd-S)P2 at period 2. Bank sells securities to repay P2S of its loans. So, bank 
now owes L2=L1-P2S to the lenders. Then we can get E2, 
Eଶ ൌ ሺNd െ SሻPଶ െ ሺLଵ െ PଶSሻ െ Lଵ         (13) 
And h is given by, 
h ൌ EమEమାLమ ൌ
NୢPమିLభ
ሺNୢିSሻPమ                                 (14) 
From equation (8) and (9), we get, L1=E1(1-h)/h and Nd=E1/h. Substitute them to 
equation (14) . We obtain, 




୦ ሻ                                      (15) 
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We can see the bank has to liquidate a fraction (1-P2)/P2 · (1-h)/h of its portfolio. 
When h=1, the bank need no liquidation. When P2=1-h, the bank has to liquidate 
all. We would like to know what happen to bank’s liquidation when the haircut h 
becomes high during the bad time and securities price in period 2 P2 declines very 
fast during a price shock. We derive, 
பS




୦ర ቁ ൏ 0                   (16) 
And the calibration (1) of equation (15) in Fig.8, we choose P2 equals 0.9, 0.7, 0.5 
respectively and h changes from 0.1 to 1. We would like to see how S reacts to 
the changing of h. 
Figure 8 calibration (1) of equation (15) 
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From equation (16) and the calibration (1), we can see that when the haircut h is 
small, the speed of liquidation procedure becomes more quickly because leverage 
is higher. Our model implies the instability of leverage bank when haircut risk 








Pమమ ቁ ൏ 0                       (17) 
And the calibration (2) of equation (15) in Fig.9, we choose h equals to 0.2, 0.4, 
0.6, respectively and P2 changes from 0.6 to 1. We would like to see how S reacts 
to the changing of P2. 
Figure 9 calibration (2) of equation (15) 
 
From equation (17) and the calibration (2), the larger is the price shock at period 2, 
the faster is the liquidation. The leverage changes the situation of banks 
dramatically. The leverage can help bank to expand its balance sheet largely 
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during the boom time, but when there is liquidation or price shock, leverage hurts 
bank most. Leverage makes bank more instable than without leverage. Moreover, 
our model also illustrates the maturity mismatch of bank which borrows short 
term debt to underwrite long term loans. The bank would not be able to maintain 
its haircut with mark-to-market accounting. From Fig.6, we can see that 
commercial banks suffered the biggest losses from 2007 subprime crisis.  




19 Table taken from Greenlaw 2008 
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Robustness 
In this section we assess whether our results are sensitive to the interest rates 
volatility. In the previous setting, we normalized interest rates to zero throughout 
the model. In the following test, we relax the interest rate assumption, such that r > 
0. The direct impact of the interest rate shock to the model is that the number of 
securities bank sells at time 2, which denoted by S, become greater at the 
beginning due to the increased cost of capital by non-zero interest rate. We denote 
S’ the number of securities bank sells at time 2 when interest rate r > 0. We can 
get S’ = S, if r = 0. And S’ = S + f(r) or S× (1 + f(r)) or S (1+f(r)), if r ≠ 0. In the 
following calibration, we would see how the non-zero interest rate r affects the S. 
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The overall calibration results of our analyses support our theoretical findings. We 
can see that the calibration lines of non-zero interest rate are only shifting with the 
calibration lines of zero interest rate. The impact of non-zero interest rate would 
not change the order of the lines. The theoretical findings reported in our early 
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Conclusion 
In broader terms, the 2007 financial crisis can be outlined as follows. The direct 
cause of the crisis was the collapse of the housing bubble in the United States. 
The housing bubble was accompanied by a significant credit expansion, 
particularly in the residential mortgage market, but also in corporate loans, 
commercial mortgages, and credit card. Mortgages and other loans were 
securitized by pooling portfolios of loans together, and tranching them into 
securities with different durations and risks criteria. Banks were intimately 
involved in both underwriting these securities and holding large inventories on 
their own books, financing them in large part through short-term borrowing. 
Banks first used their scare capital to originate and securitize loans to meet the 
demand by foreigners, pension funds and insurance companies for AAA-rated 
securities. Because the moral hazard problem on the bank’s part ended up due to 
the presence of the secondary market, the investors could use information 
advantage over the bank and apply such information strategically against the 
banks. The consequence of the process was that investors bought up good quality 
loans and left bad loans to banks. In the meantime, banks earned large fees by 
selling loans and were reluctant to sell bad portfolio loans at discount price. 
Because, in good times, these loans were high yield and safe and banks expected 
to make extraordinary temporary profits. We can see that banks make large profits 
in almost every stage of the securities life and in any quality of the loans, which is 
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a typical profit maximizing behavior. Another significant reason for holding high 
price bad quality loans is using securities it holds as collateral, especially 
collateral in Repo (Repurchase agreement) market. The increasing reliance on 
short-term debt caused a maturity mismatch. A large part of banks’ liabilities had 
to be rolled over on a daily basis, which made banks more fragile when they 
encountered the crisis.  
Due to these activities, bank profits grew significantly. Between 2002 and 2006, 
aggregate net income for U.S. commercial banks increased 50 percent.20As the 
housing bubble collapsed, mortgages began to default. The summer of 2007 saw 
rapid declines in the prices of mortgage-related securities. The price collapse 
effectively ended new securitizations. With rapidly falling prices, banks suffered 
large losses.  
My theoretical model suggests that banks got themselves into so much trouble not 
because their irrationality or misestimate but by taking advantage of extraordinary 





20 Bech and Rice, 2009, Table A.2 
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